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Abstract
The cloud data center is a complex system composed of
power, cooling, and IT subsystems. The power subsystem
is crucial to feed the IT equipment. Power disruptions
may result in service unavailability. This paper analyzes
the impact of the power subsystem failures on IT ser-
vices regarding different architecture configurations based
on TIA-942 standard such as non-redundant, redundant,
concurrently maintainable, and fault tolerant. We model
both subsystems, power and IT, through Stochastic Petri
Net (SPN). The availability results show that a fault
tolerant power and IT configuration reduces the downtime
from 54.1 to 34.5 hours/year when compared to a non-
redundant architecture. The sensibility analysis results
show that the failure and repair rates of the server
component in a fault tolerant system present the highest
impact on overall data center availability.
1. Introduction
According to Gartner, Inc1, a company that does not
employ the cloud will be as obsolete as the companies
out of the Internet today; the migration to a cloud-based
solution is practically unavoidable. Therefore, the cloud
is essential to companies to provide their services with
higher availability. Due to a growing number of enterprises
using services on cloud infrastructure, many challenges
begin to emerge. Cloud providers ought to estimate how
physical and logical failures occurring on a data center
can impact their users’ perception, in order to reduce the
1http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3354117
service downtime and improve their service availability.
Service downtime affects user experience and is directly
translated into revenue loss to the cloud provider [10]. The
Ponemon Institute study [12] showed that among the data
center interruptions origins, Uninterruptible Power Supply
(UPS) failure appears at the top of the list causing around
25% of unplanned interruption.
Recently, an IT (Information Technology) failure in
the British Airways data center resulted in 600 flights
canceled affecting about 75,000 passengers with a cost of
$112 million. The IT failure occurred due to a problem in
the power subsystem. According to data center specialists,
after IT problems, power disruptions are the second most
common cause of data center unavailability2. Therefore, a
cloud provider needs to understand the failures at power
subsystem and their impacts on IT subsystem in order
to avoid or mitigate service downtime. Several compo-
nents may impact overall data center availability. Hence,
identifying most critical components is useful to improve
availability by increasing their redundancy or replacing
them by more reliable components. Due to the difficulties
on carrying out studies in an operational and real data
center, we adopt modeling techniques to estimate the data
center availability, and use real data from the literature.
This paper presents a set of stochastic models to repre-
sent the data center infrastructure based on Telecommuni-
cations Industry Association standard (TIA-942), focusing
on two main subsystems, power and IT. We also present a
model that integrates both power and IT subsystems. The
main goal is to analyze the availability level of the cloud
services hosted in a data center and how component re-
dundancy can improve the overall data center availability.
2http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2017/05/30/british-
air-data-center-outage-feeds-outrage-at-airline-cost-cuts/
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Moreover, we also evaluate, through sensitivity analysis,
how components’ failures and repair rates impact on cloud
services’ availability.
2. Background
In this section, we describe data center standards for avail-
ability evaluation, focusing on power and IT subsystems.
Next, we present a brief description about Petri Nets.
2.1. Data Center Standardization
Data center standards define best practices and recommen-
dations regarding data center design and infrastructure.
Such standards denote the three subsystems that composes
a data center: power, cooling and IT.
According to TIA-942 standard, a tier is different
from another one regarding the number of redundant
components (i.e., N means no redundancy; and N + 1
means redundancy with one component) and distribution
paths (i.e. single or multiple paths that may be active
or passive). TIA-942 defines four tiers, from I to IV,
where higher tiers provide greater availability, resulting
in higher costs and operational complexities. Therefore,
the tier selection depends on the business requirements,
such as required service availability, deployment costs,
and downtime financial consequences.
2.2. Power subsystem components
The data center power subsystem is responsible for feed-
ing non-critical, critical, and mechanical loads (Figure
1(a)). The non-critical loads may be interrupted without
impacting the data center availability and consists of
lighting, work stations, and supplementary equipment.
On the other hand, the mechanical and critical loads
impact the data center availability. The mechanical loads
refer to cooling units. Mechanical loads affect indirectly
the data center availability, i.e, once the power to the
cooling subsystem is interrupted, the IT equipment will
be operating for a while, until it gets overheated, and shut
downs. Lastly, we have the critical loads composed of
the IT equipment. Faults in the power components that
feed the critical load directly affect the overall data center
availability.
A typical power system infrastructure includes an utility
substation, an alternate power source, a transfer switch
gear or an Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS), an UPS
system, and a Power Distribution Unit (PDU). The main
power supply of a data center is the utility substation. Data
centers may also contain an alternative power feed (such
as solar, wind, bioenergy, hydroelectric and wave) [13].
Both primary and secondary power sources are connected
to an ATS. The ATS provides input for the non-critical,
critical, and mechanical loads. Following the critical load
distribution path, the ATS feeds the UPS system (batter-
ies). Then, the UPS system routes power to the PDU (rack
socket for cabinets). Lastly, the PDU distributes electrical
power to the IT equipment.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Tier I of (a) Power and (b) IT Subsystems (adapted from [1]).
2.3. IT subsystem components
A data center IT subsystem is basically composed of
servers, storage, and network components. The storage
is illustrated as Network Attached Storage (NAS) Disk
Array. Network is represented by Edge, Core, Aggregation
routers, and Access switch (Figure 1(b)). The Storage
Area Network (SAN) is a network component used in
Tier IV to connect array disks to servers.
Servers host applications and is composed of CPUs,
NICs, and RAMs. The storage system stores server’s
application data and consist of disk drives or flash devices
connected through a SAN. Technologies such as NAS and
Redundant Array of Independent Drives (RAID) connects
servers to remote storage systems and provides high-
availability, respectively. Lastly, networking devices con-
nect servers and storage systems and manage all data flow
from/to the data center. The network design is typically
based on the core, distribution, and edge levels and relies
on switches, hubs, routers, among others.
2.4. Petri Nets
A Petri Net is a well-known model to model system with
respect to evaluate performance and dependability [6].
White circles represent places, receiving tokens, where a
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set of tokens (markup) represents the state of a system,
such as number of processors, tasks, and clients. The
rectangles comprise transitions, executing actions such as
consume and/or produce tokens. There are three types
of transitions: timed exponential, which fires after a time
parameter related to a exponential distribution; immediate,
that fires instantly; and timed non-exponential. Arcs estab-
lish a connection between places and transitions. There are
two arc types: directed and inhibitor.
Transitions are only enabled to fire if all preconditions
are fulfilled as, for example, if there are enough tokens
in the input places. When a transition fires and it is
connected with input and output places via a directed
arc, the transition consumes an amount of tokens from
its input places and produces tokens at all of its out-
put places. Otherwise, if the arc is an inhibitor one,
the precondition on firing is that there is no token in
the input place. Transitions also can be activated with
a guard function, a boolean expression composed of
places, transitions, and tokens. For instance, consider
the guard function GFsystemDown = (#machineon =
0)AND(#routerson = 0). It means that the transition
GFsystemDown will be enabled only if there are no tokens
in places #machineon and #routerson.
The stochastic transitions can have two different firing
semantics: single server and infinite server. In case of
single server semantics, when a transition fires, a new
delay is associated with this transition, and the fires are
sequential. In case of infinite server transition, a set of
tokens in determined place are processed in parallel and
one fire does not interfere in others [5].
Petri Nets is a specification method, that we can use to
estimate the system availability (or any other metric). To
solve it, one can use two options: (a) analytic solution
by using Markov Chain, where all transitions follows
exponential distributions; or (b) simulations using theory
of discrete event simulation. In this work, we use the term
building block to refer to a set of places and transitions
representing a system component.
2.5. Reliability Block Diagram
Reliability Diagram Block (RBD) is a mathematical tool
that can be used to calculate reliability, availability, and
maintainability of systems. The components of systems
is represented by a set of blocks, that can be arranged
logically in series or in parallel. In series configurations,
if one component fails, the overall system will fail too.
However, in parallel configuration, if only one component
is working, the system will be operational [4].
3. Power Subsystem Model
This Section describes a data center power infrastructure
regarding Tiers I to IV. The following models are based
on the TIA-942 standard.
3.1. Power Subsystem Tier I
A data center power subsystem is mainly composed of
utility, generator, ATS, UPS, and PDU. In our models, we
represent those components as a building block containing
two places and two transitions (may be timed or immedi-
ate transitions). The places refer to the state of the compo-
nent, that may be UP (available) or DOWN (unavailable).
The transitions indicate the repair and failure rates of the
component and may have guard functions. All the guard
functions used in our models (Tiers I to IV) are listed in
Table I. In the next subsections, we explain in detail the
power components and how they are interconnected.
TABLE I
GUARD FUNCTIONS OF POWER SUBSYSTEM - TIERS I, II, III AND IV
Transition Guard Function
PW IT 1 (#PW GENERATOR 1 UP = 0)
PW IT 9 (#PW GENERATOR 2 UP = 0)
PW IT 3
((#PW UTILITY 1 UP>0)OR (#PW GENERATOR 1 UP>0))
AND (#PW ATS 1 UP>0)
PW IT 11
((#PW UTILITY 2 UP>0)OR (#PW GENERATOR 2 UP>0))
AND (#PW ATS 2 UP>0)
PW IT 4
((#PW UTILITY 1 UP = 0)AND (#PW GENERATOR 1 UP = 0))
OR (#PW ATS 1 UP = 0)
PW IT 12
((#PW UTILITY 2 UP = 0)AND (#PW GENERATOR 2 UP = 0))
OR (#PW ATS 2 UP = 0)
PW IT 5 (#PW UPSMODULE 1 UP>0)OR (#PW MAINSWB 1 UP = 1)
PW IT 13 (#PW UPSMODULE 2 UP>0)OR (#PW MAINSWB 2 UP = 1)
PW IT 6 (#PW UPSMODULE 1 UP = 0)AND (#PW MAINSWB 1 UP = 0)
PW IT 14 (#PW UPSMODULE 2 UP = 0)AND (#PW MAINSWB 2 UP = 0)
PW IT 7
(T ier I and II)
(#PW SECONDSWB 1 UP = 1)AND (#PW PDU 1 UP>0)
PW IT 8
(T ier I and II)
(#PW SECONDSWB 1 UP = 0)OR (#PW PDU 1 UP = 0)
PW IT 7
(T ier III)
((#PW SECONDSWB 1 UP = 1)AND (#PW PDU 1 UP>0))
OR ((#PW MAINSWB 2 UP = 1)AND (#PW PDU 2 UP>0))
PW IT 8
(T ier III)
((#PW SECONDSWB 1 UP = 0)OR (#PW PDU 1 UP = 0))
AND ((#PW MAINSWB 2 UP = 0)OR (#PW PDU 2 UP = 0))
PW IT 7
(T ier IV )
((#PW SECONDSWB 1 UP = 1)AND (#PW PDU 1 UP>0))
OR ((#PW SECONDSWB 2 UP = 1)AND (#PW PDU 2 UP>0))
PW IT 8
(T ier IV )
((#PW SECONDSWB 1 UP = 0)OR (#PW PDU 1 UP = 0))
AND ((#PW SECONDSWB 2 UP = 0)OR (#PW PDU 2 UP = 0))
3.1.1 Utility, generator and ATS components
In a tier I data center, the utility
(PW UTILITY 1 UP/DOWN) is the main power
supply. A generator (PW GENERATOR 1 UP/DOWN)
if available (PW AVGENERATOR 1 UP) is used when
the utility fails (PW IT 1). We highlight that in order
to simplify our models and to obtain the simulation
results of tiers III and IV in a feasible time, we do not
consider the required time to start the generator. The
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guard function of this immediate transition ensures that
a single generator is turned on at a time. On the other
hand, the transition (PW IT 2) turn off the generator
after the utility recovery.
Fig. 2. Utility, generator, and ATS components
The ATS (PW ATS 1 UP/DOWN) component switches
between utility and generator power sources. The ATS
supplies power to the inside of the data center. Lastly, we
have the building block (PW MAINSWB 1 UP/DOWN)
that put together the utility, generator, and ATS compo-
nents, indicating if they are able or not to provide energy
to the data center. Therefore, it will be able if (PW IT 3)
the utility or the generator is available and the ATS is
working. On the other hand, it won’t be able if (PW IT 4)
both utility and generator fails or the ATS fails. Note that
the ATS is a single point of failure in the tier I power
subsystem. The Figure 2 shows these power components.
3.1.2 UPS and PDU components
Following the description of the components of
the power distribution path in a data center, next
we present the UPS and PDU components. The
UPS (PW UPSMODULE 1 UP/DOWN) aims to pro-
vide energy to critical loads (IT equipment) when the
utility and the generator are unavailable. The PDU
(PW PDU 1 UP/DOWN) distributes energy to the racks
to feed the IT equipment.
We also have two more building blocks. The first one
(PW SECONDSWB 1 UP/DOWN) has the same idea of
the PW MAINSWB 1 UP/DOWN but including different
components, to simplify, in our model it includes only
the UPS module, but it could also include batteries
or a bypass, for instance. The secondary switchboard
(PW SECONDSWB 1 UP/DOWN) will be able to for-
ward energy to the PDU component if (PW IT 5) the
building block PW MAINSWB 1 UP/DOWN or the UPS
component is available. Otherwise (PW IT 6) it will
not be able to feed the IT equipment. The second one
(PW SSPOWERTOIT UP/DOWN) represents the overall
(all power components) power subsystem, indicating if
they are able to provide (PW IT 7) energy to the IT
equipment or not (PW IT 8). As described on these
guard functions the IT equipment will be powered if
both PW SECONDSWB 1 UP and PDU components are
available. Otherwise, the data center will be unavailable.
The Figure 2 shows these power components.
Fig. 3. The UPS and PDU components
3.2. Power Subsystem Tier II
Tier II data center power system has redundant generator
and UPS in addition to all components of tier I. Therefore,
we have N + 1 generator (PW AVGENERATOR 1 UP)
and UPS (PW UPSMODULE 1 UP/DOWN). This re-
dundant configuration eliminates the single point of failure
in the UPS component, providing a higher availability than
the tier I. Both UPS modules work simultaneously and
synchronizes the output voltage to the IT equipment. The
guard functions are described in Table I.
3.3. Power Subsystem Tier III
In a tier III power subsystem we have redundant com-
ponents and two independent distribution paths serving
the computer equipment (N+1 generator and UPS in the
primary path). A tier III configuration is concurrently
maintainable, allowing the maintenance of components in
a distribution path without system disruptions. Besides,
all IT equipment is dual powered (each one linked to
independent distribution paths).
The guard functions are described in Table I. We
highlight that, differently from tier I and II, in a
tier III configuration the power subsystem will not
be able to feed the IT equipment if (PW IT 8) the
PW SECONDSWB 1 UP/DOWN or PDU component of
the primary distribution path fails along with a failure in
the PW MAINSWB 2 UP/DOWN or PDU component in
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the secondary path. Otherwise (PW IT 7), the subsystem
is able to provide energy to the critical load.
3.4. Power Subsystem Tier IV
The tier IV power subsystem configuration is composed of
two complete (all power components) distributions paths
serving IT equipment (N+1 generator and UPS in both
paths). This configuration is fault tolerant and the main
power feed are the UPS modules. Besides, it eliminates
single point of failure. The tier IV model was modeled
as show in Figure 4. Differently from the tier III, tier IV
power subsystem has a fully redundant distribution path.
The guard functions are described in Table I. The
building block (PW MAINSWB 2 UP/DOWN) puts to-
gether the utility, generator, and ATS components of the
secondary distribution path and indicates if they are able
(PW IT 11) or not (PW IT 12) to provide energy.
We also point out that, differently from tier III, the
critical load in the second distribution path of tier IV
may be powered by the utility, generator, or UPS mod-
ules, providing a higher availability. The building block
(PW SECONDSWB 2 UP/DOWN) of the secondary path
will be able to forward energy to the PDU compo-
nent if (PW IT 13) the PW MAINSWB 2 UP/DOWN or
the UPS component is available. Otherwise (PW IT 14)
it will not be able. The tier IV subsystem will
be able to feed the IT equipment if (PW IT 7)
both PW SECONDSWB 1 UP and PDU component
of the first distribution path are available or both
PW SECONDSWB 2 UP and PDU component of the
second path are available.
4. IT Subsystem Model
In our models, we are considering an application running
on top of the IT infrastructure in the data center. To model
service, we used a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) to
represent dependency between service components. The
IT infrastructure is comprised by network components,
storage, and servers. However, the behavior of the IT
infrastructure components are modeled using SPN. These
models are described next.
4.1. RBD model of service
Figure 5 shows the RBD that represent service component.
We considered that a server is composed of: hardware
(HW), operating system (OS), virtual machine (VM) and
the application (APP) instance that is running on this
server. It is worth mentioning that any application can
Fig. 4. Tier IV power subsystem
be modeled, once the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) and
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) values are known.
Solving the RBD ([19]), we obtain the MTTF and
MTTR values of the entire service component. These
values will be added in transitions referring to the server
in our SPN model (Figure 7), described next.
Fig. 5. RBD model of service, based from [4]
4.2. IT Subsystem Tier I
In this work, we disregarded some components of the
infrastructure illustrated in the Figure 1(b). The Edge
router WAN was disregarded because is used for corporate
networks, and does not affect the availability of service.
We also disregard the large frame processing and disk
array attached to it, because is used for backup, and does
not impact the availability service.
Each network component is modeled using a building
block with two places and two transitions. Places means
the state of components (UP or DOWN) and transitions
represent actions of these components (fail and repair). For
example, the Core router is modeled as shown in figure 6.
The place IT CORE 1 UP represents when the Core
router is UP, while the place IT CORE 1 DOWN
represents when this component is down. The failure
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of this component is modeled by transition IT ET 3,
that consumes a token in place IT CORE 1 UP and
produces a token in place IT CORE 1 DOWN . Core
router repair is modeled by transition IT ET 4, and
follows the inverse path of the failure transition. The other
network components are similarly modeled, each one with
own building block, as shown in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. SPN network components tier I
Storage and service differ from network components
due to the addition of more places and transitions, as
shown in Figure 7. This is due to the fact that when
one network component fails, server and storage also
become unavailable. So, we used an additional place and
transitions to model this behavior. For example, service
are modeled using a building block with places up/down
and transitions failure/repair, like network components.
The immediate transition IT IT 1 fires when a network
component connected to the servers fails. When this
component is repaired, the immediate transition IT IT 2
fires, and the server become available again. Storage is
modeled in a similar way.
Fig. 7. Storage and server tier I
Fig. 8. Building block regard-
ing IT infrastructure status
The behavior mentioned above is assured by guard
functions, described in Table II. As can be seen in Figure
1(b), only Edge router, Core router, Aggregation router,
and Access Switch are connected to servers. So, if one
these components fails, servers will become unavailable.
This behavior is modeled by guard function associated
with transition IT IT 1. On the other hand, if all compo-
nents are running, the servers are available, and this behav-
ior is ensured by guard function associated with transition
IT IT 2. Guard functions present in immediate transi-
tion associated with transition IT IT 3 and associated
with transition IT IT 4 are similar, but only Edge router,
Core router, Aggregation router are connected to storage,
therefore the failure of one of these components will
make the storage unavailable. This behavior is modeled
by the guard function associated with transition IT IT 3.
The guard function present in transition IT IT 4 models
these components repair, allowing storage to become
available again.
TABLE II
GUARD FUNCTIONS OF IT SUBSYSTEM - TIERS I TO IV
Transition Guard Function
IT IT 1
((#IT ED 1 UP = 0)OR(#IT CORE 1 UP = 0)
OR(#IT AG 1 UP = 0)OR(#IT AC 1 UP = 0))
IT IT 2
((#IT ED 1 UP > 0)AND(#IT CORE 1 UP > 0)
AND(#IT AG 1 UP > 0)AND(#IT AC 1 UP > 0))
IT IT 3
((#IT ED 1 UP = 0)OR(#IT CORE 1 UP = 0)
OR(#IT AG 1 UP = 0))
IT IT 4
((#IT ED 1 UP > 0)AND(#IT CORE 1 UP > 0)
AND(#IT AG 1 UP > 0))
IT IT 5
(tier I and II)
((#IT NAS 1 UP > 0)AND(#IT SERV 1 UP > 0))
IT IT 6
(tier I and II)
((#IT NAS 1 UP = 0)OR(#IT SERV 1 UP = 0))
The Figure 8 shows the building block that represents
the status of the IT infrastructure. When the IT infras-
tructure is working (token in place IT SS 1 UP ), if
servers or storage fails, the immediate transition IT IT 6
fires, making the system unavailable (token in place
IT SS 1 DOWN ). When server and storage become
running again, the immediate transition IT IT 5 fires,
making IT infrastructure available again. The guard func-
tions of these transitions are described in Table II.
4.3. IT Subsystem Tier II
The main difference between tier I and II is the dual Inter-
net access link of Edge router. If one link fails, the second
one will still keep the data center Internet connection. To
represent this redundancy in our model, we just added a
token in place IT IT ED 1 UP . So, if one link fails,
one token will go to place IT IT ED 1 DOWN but
there will still be another token in the UP place.
4.4. IT Subsystem Tier III and IV
According TIA-942 specification, the differences between
tiers III and IV are about low-level components such as
cabling redundancy, component location, etc. However,
since we are modeling components at a higher level, we
disregard these differences. Therefore, tiers III and IV are
modeled in a similar way.
In tiers III and IV, all components are redundant in
order to keep the data center available, in case of un-
planned outages. In addition, in tier III and IV there are
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more components compared to tier I. Two SAN switches
connect servers to disk arrays to provide storage. Similarly
to previous tiers, in tiers III and IV large frame processing
and edge router are disregarded. To model redundant
components, there are two tokens in UP places and infinite
server policy is used in transitions. The SPN model of tiers
III and IV is presented in Figure 9.
Fig. 9. SPN model of IT infrastructure - tiers III and IV
As the model is very similar to tier I, all stochas-
tic and immediate transitions of tier I are also
used in tier III and IV models. SAN switch is
represented by a building block with two places
IT SAN 1 UP and IT SAN 1 DOWN , and re-
pair/failure transitions IT ET 14 and IT ET 13,
like other components. The component that represents
new array disk is similar to server and NAS com-
ponents. The place IT DISK ARRAY 1 UP rep-
resents when new disk array is UP, while place
IT DISK ARRAY 1 DOWN represents when it is
DOWN.
Stochastic transitions IT ET 15 and IT ET 16
model repair and failure of new disk array, respectively.
However, when both SAN switches fail, the second array
disks will be unavailable (IT DISK ARRAY 1 UN ),
and this behavior is assured by the guard function present
in immediate transition IT IT 7. This transition con-
sumes tokens of place IT DISK ARRAY 1 UP and
produces a token in place IT DISK ARRAY 1 UN .
When a single SAN switch is repaired, the second
array disk become available again, as modeled in
guard function present in immediate transition IT IT 8.
This transition consumes all tokens present in place
IT DISK ARRAY 1 UN and produces a token in
place IT DISK ARRAY 1 UP . These guard func-
tions and respective transitions are presented in Table III.
As tier III and IV have an addition array disks to
storage, guard functions presents in immediate transitions
IT IT 5 and IT IT 6 change. Now, when at least one
of the storage way is working and servers are working,
system is available. On the other hand, when servers are
not working or both storage way are not working, system
are unavailable. These guard functions are described in
Table III.
TABLE III
GUARD FUNCTIONS OF IMMEDIATE TRANSITIONS - TIER III AND IV
Transition Guard Function
IT IT 5
(#IT SERV 1 UP>0)AND
((#IT NAS 1 UP>0) OR(#IT DISK ARRAY 1 UP>0))
IT IT 6
(#IT SERV 1 UP = 0)OR
((#IT NAS 1 UP = 0) AND(#IT DISK ARRAY 1 UP = 0))
IT IT 7 (#IT SAN 1 UP = 0)
IT IT 8 (#IT SAN 1 UP > 0)
5. Integrating Power and IT Subsystems
In order to integrate iers I to IV, we added the building
block shown in Figure 10. This building block represents
the overall (power and IT) data center availability, which
may be available (DC 1 UP ) or not (DC 1 DOWN ).
Fig. 10. Building block regarding the power and IT integration.
The immediate transitions DC IT 1 and DC IT 2
have guard functions representing the repair and failure
conditions of the data center, see Table IV. As described
in Table IV, the data center will be available only if
the power subsystem is able to feed the IT equipment
(#PW SSPOWERTOIT UP = 1) and the IT sub-
system is working (#IT SS 1 UP = 1), (see immedi-
ate transition DC IT 1). On the other hand, a power
subsystem failure will result in IT system disruptions.
Besides, a failure in the IT subsystem will also result in
the data center unavailability, (see transition DC IT 2).
The overall data center availability (integration of the
power and IT subsystems) is given by Equation 1 bellow.
DCavailability = P{(#DC 1 UP = 1)} (1)
From this equation, the data center availability is the
probability of having a token in place DC 1 UP . This
way, we may analyze the impact of power failures on the
availability of the IT subsystem.
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TABLE IV
GUARD FUNCTIONS OF THE IMMEDIATE TRANSITIONS OF THE
INTEGRATION
Transition Guard Function
DC IT 1
(#PW SSPOWERTOIT UP = 1)AND
(#IT SS 1 UP = 1)
DC IT 2
(#PW SSPOWERTOIT UP = 0)OR
(#IT SS 1 UP = 0)
6. Evaluation
The MTTF and MTTR values of the video stream appli-
cation (considering VLC to Encode/decode of videos) are
shown in Table V and parameters related to the power and
IT subsystems are represented in Table VI. We used the
Mercury tool [18] for all analysis.
TABLE V
MTTF AND MTTR VALUES OF THE VLC APPLICATION (FROM [4])
Components MTTF (hr/yr) MTTR (hr/yr)
HW 8,760 1.667
OS 1,440 1
VM 1,880 0.167
APP 336 1
TABLE VI
MTTF AND MTTR VALUES OF POWER (FROM [15] AND [8]) AND IT
COMPONENTS (FROM [11], [17], AND [16])
Component MTTF (hr/yr) MTTR (hr/yr)
Utility 257.2678158 0.03280086594
Generator 9,733.307378 3.9000039
ATS 102,093.9468 5.739869131
UPS Module 27,472.52747 8
PDU 282,581.0 156.0062402
Edge Router 796 1
Core Router 16,243 0.78
Aggregation Router 8,247 0.63
Access Switch 13,043.48 0.35
Service (obtained from RBD) 231.6581 0.9157
NAS 1,200,000 12
SAN 255,358 7.66
Disk Array 1,200,000 12
6.1. Availability Analysis
The availability analysis results were obtained through
stationary simulations, and are shown in Table VII. This
table is composed of the availability level, the number of
9’s, and the downtime related to tiers I to IV.
Tier I offers approximately 99.38% of availability with
a downtime of 54.16 hours/year. The N + 1 redundancy
in the generator, UPS module, and access link of the edge
router on tier II reduced the downtime to 13.3 hours when
compared to tier I. In tier III, the use of a secondary
distribution path (no UPS components) and redundant
IT equipment reduced by downtime even more (to 6.3
hours) compared to tier II. Lastly, in tier IV a complete
and secondary distribution path (with UPS components)
reduced by the downtime in 9.72 seconds compared with
tier III. A downtime reduction of 9.72 seconds may be
expressive depending on the business needs. We also
point out that from tier I (no redundant) to tier IV (fully
redundant) reduced by the downtime in 19.65 hours.
TABLE VII
SERVICE AVAILABILITY
Tier Availability (%)(Min - Average - Max)
Number
of 9’s
Downtime
(hr/yr)
I 99.38164 - 99.381690 - 99.38173 2.2087 54.1639
II 99.53373 - 99.533775 - 99.53381 2.3314 40.8412
III 99.606034 - 99.606035 - 99.606036 2.4045 34.5112
IV 99.606065 - 99.606066 - 99.606067 2.4045 34.5085
6.2. Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis results were obtained using the
percentage difference method. From this analysis we ob-
tained the sensitivity ranking of all power and IT com-
ponents. Table VIII presents the top three most sensitive
components from tier I to IV.
Then, we conducted a further sensitivity analysis in
the top two component’s rate. With this analysis we may
verify the impact in overall data center availability varying
(in 10% using five sample points) the MTTF and MTTR
rates of a single component at a time. The results are
shown in Figures 11 to 18. From the results, we highlight
that increasing the mean time to failure of server in 20%
(46.33 hours) has the highest impact in case of Tier IV,
where it reduced by the downtime in 5.73 hours (from
34.50% to 28.77%). On the other hand, decreasing the
repair time of server by 20% (10.98 minutes) has a higher
availability impact on Tier IV (compared to other tiers),
reducing the overall downtime in 6.87 hours (from 34.50%
to 27.62%). Therefore, shortening the repair time of the
server can considerably improve data center availability.
7. Related Work
There are some works that model data center infrastruc-
ture, such as [2; 8; 3; 7; 14]. For instance, a RBD model
for evaluating availability and reliability of modular UPS
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Fig. 11. Tier I: Sensitivity analy-
sis of the MTTF server.
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Fig. 12. Tier I: Sensitivity analy-
sis of the MTTR server.
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Fig. 13. Tier II: Sensitivity anal-
ysis of the MTTF server.
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Fig. 14. Tier II: Sensitivity anal-
ysis of the MTTR server.
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Fig. 15. Tier III: Sensitivity anal-
ysis of the MTTF server.
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Fig. 16. Tier III: Sensitivity anal-
ysis of the MTTR server.
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Fig. 17. Tier IV: Sensitivity anal-
ysis of the MTTF server.
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Fig. 18. Tier IV: Sensitivity anal-
ysis of the MTTR server.
TABLE VIII
SENSITIVITY RANKING
Tier Parameter Sensitivity Index Tier Parameter Sensitivity Index
I
MTTF Server 7.8595 x 10−4
III
MTTF Server 7.9549 x 10−4
MTTR Server 7.7678 x 10−4 MTTR Server 7.8704 x 10−4
MTTF Edge Router 2.5944 x 10−4 MTTF Edge Router 1.2862 x 10−6
II
MTTF Server 7.9386 x 10−4
IV
MTTF Server 7.9528 x 10−4
MTTR Server 7.8786 x 10−4 MTTR Server 7.8741 x 10−4
MTTR PDU 1.1233 x 10−4 MTTR Edge Router 1.5268 x 10−6
was proposed by [2]. Authors compared different UPS
configurations under temperature variation. Their results
showed that varying the UPS configuration increased the
availability and reliability system. However, authors do not
assess the impact of UPS system in service availability.
In [8], authors presented models to evaluate the impact,
cost, and dependability of data center cooling and power
infrastructures. RBD and SPN was used to model different
architectures. They proposed an incremental architecture
where components with most reliability and cost impor-
tance were replicated. Authors focused on sustainable im-
pact and availability and reliability power system. While,
we evaluate impact of power and IT in service availability.
Authors in [9] proposed models to evaluate an emer-
gency call center, with focus on evaluating power system
impacts in call center service downtime. The call center
architecture modeled is composed of energy, networking,
voice, and customer service structures. They used RBD
to represent logical dependencies of the components and
SPN to represent the energy components’ behavior. Dif-
ferently from authors, our work considers power and IT
subsystems and their impact on service availability.
Our work differs from the literature because we pro-
posed models based on TIA-942 standard. At the same
time, we evaluate the impact of power infrastructure in
cloud services availability running an IT infrastructure of
data center. We also performed sensitivity analysis to de-
tect components that most impact on service availability.
8. Final Considerations
This paper presented a set of RBD and SPN models
integrating power and IT subsystems of a data center.
Based on the availability results of simulations, using
redundant component in power and IT systems, can
considerably decrease downtime of a service running in
the data centers. Changing the architecture from a tier
I data center to tier IV, lead to roughly 36.28 percent
(19.65 hours/year) reduction in the service downtime.
From sensitivity analysis, we observed that the server
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failure and repair rates have the highest impact on the
data center availability. Moreover, we analyzed the server
component individually to see how much it affects the
overall availability. Results showed that in Tier IV the
server repair and failure rates have the highest impact
on availability when compared to other tiers. As future
work we aim to integrate the power, cooling, and IT
subsystems by modeling their interconnections in order
to better estimate the overall data center availability.
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